The Peanut Gallery: Russia Throws Army to the Four Corners of Ukraine, Paralyzing Them in Event of Counterattack.
The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat-effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast
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For newcomers, this is an amateur's take on the ISW daily bullet points. I know nothing.
The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat-effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
Curses! Who could have foreseen such obvious consequences?!
ISW underplays Ukrainian actions along the Dnipro with this headline, but the long and short of it is that we’re seeing a gradual but inexorable increase in offensive activity. Yesterday it was that APC that had everyone in a tizzy; today it’s action around Krynky. Ukraine pushed to the highway which runs along its south and now threaten the logistical connection to its sister city, Kozachi Laheri, to the west. Securing both those cities will give Ukraine control over the northern entrance to the Oleshky Sands.
The question now is whether Russia has the capacity to both maintain its offensive in Avdiivka, hold their positions along the Dnipro, and fulfill their various other commitments along the front at the same time. The ISW has their doubts.
The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat-ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro.
Okay, hypothetical time.
Congratulations! You’ve been promoted to oversee the invasion of Ukraine! It’s not going well. Please ignore the corpse of your predecessor bleeding onto the warroom table, Putin was grumpy. Our Dear Leader has tasked you with stabilizing the frontline. What do you do?
If you answered anything other than, “Attack Bakhmut,” then you clearly haven’t been paying attention.
Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
Yes, in the middle of a flailing offensive in Avdiivka, Ukrainian territorial gains in Zaporizhya, and whatever the fuck is happening in Kherson, the RF MoD decided now is the time to regain some lost ground near Bakhmut. The gains are minor, but they are tangible, and I suppose that’s all Putin really needs to keep up the image of a victorious war for the folks back home.
More interesting (to me, at least) is why Russia is managing to make gains: Ukraine is pulling equipment and personnel out of the region. To reposition where? Nobody knows, but I’m sure-as-fuck curious. It implies an intentional mustering of strength. This, combined with the decrease in offensive operations along the line, hints Ukraine is prepping to retake the initiative.
In Ukraine, Rasputitsa typically ends around November 15th. That said, weather reports say it’s going to wet and muddy until at least Thanksgiving (Nov.24th), possibly into December. If Ukraine does launch a significant push then then weather will greatly hamper maneuverability.
Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
Further signs of RF MoD equipment and manpower shortages. Putin is increasingly turning over responsibility of critical state infrastructure to irregular outfits because the state-proper is unable to fulfill its security commitments. These PMCs have two distinct advantages in that they’re,
Better paid.
Able to recruit from outside Russia.
Shoigu obviously isn’t eager to experience a Prigozhin-sequel (neither is Putin), so the solution appears to be to stick the PMCs to cover rear positions and instead use ethnic Russians to fight their war. It does mean, however, that these PMCs will be in near total control of the primary sources of state revenue, so Putin best make sure the checks clear.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
Once a year Putin deigns to answer questions from the masses on live television. Last year he canceled because he didn’t want to deal with tough asks like, “If we’re winning, then why is it getting harder to provide for my family?” and “When is my Daddy coming home from Ukraine?”
Naturally this year isn’t much better. The Kremlin combined the events and pushed them until the last month of the year and began to lay the groundwork for its cancellation. Their hope is to frame the press conference in the context of a victory. Avdiivka was supposed to play that role, but that hasn’t really panned out like they expected, so the Kremlin is weighing skipping it entirely. Technically Russia is in the midst of an election season. Technically. If the Kremlin hopes to maintain the already thin facade of democracy, then Putin needs to go through with the event.
Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
Upon initial reading I thought this was a fuckup. It wasn’t.
Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.
Terrorism, essentially.
Liberia is a tiny state in West Africa. Putin likely chose it because he knows that it’s incapable of retaliation.
Putin attacking a civilian vessel sends a message to all merchant ships that they will be targeted. The attempt is to scare cargo ships away from risking a trip to Odessa.
And if that was the goal then this was a pitiful display of weakness. Putin is only striking these vessels because the BSF is incapable of striking anything of more military value. Most the BSF these days is a smoldering slag heap, and they’re unable to operate west of Kerch. Sending a cruise missile to home in on a civilian transponder probably pushes the limits of their capabilities.
Maybe I’m being too harsh...despite countless setbacks, the BSF showed resolve and pushed through to make themselves relevant, dammit. Sure, they’ve had a rough go of it lately, but we should acknowledge their determination.
Good job, BSF. You can still kill civilians.
Israeli forces advanced to a Hamas security headquarters in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
Read: local hardpoint.
Yes, taking these positions is likely difficult, but the challenge likely pales in comparison to the hell of holding it,
Hamas and other Palestinian militia fighters are continuing their attacks against the IDF behind the Israeli forward line of advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations.
Gaza City is a novel twist on the defense in depth doctrine. In its more traditional exercise, units give ground to bog down the enemy and encourage them to overextend. Hamas has taken that idea to the next level: their network of tunnels enable them to threaten the enemy’s rear. Every inch of occupied territory needs to be garrisoned like the contact line, at least until the tunnels are cleared.
It’s also why Israel has taken the approach they have to the offensive. By limiting their thrust to the coast, they strike along a line most vulnerable to underground flooding, while maintaining focus on the Al Shifa Headquarters.
IDF progress is slow but constant.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed militias conducted three cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
One of the things I find most frustrating about this conflict are the neverending series of middle school-tier club names. They’re all simultaneously extremely unique, yet somehow identical and utterly forgettable. Today’s was “Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s Golan Liberation Brigade” which is somehow distinct from Hezbollah in Libya. These guys specifically wish to conquer the Golan Heights...for some reason. Follow your dreams, I guess.
Anyway, Harakat Hezbollah sent a few token projectiles over the border today. So still no signs of intents of escalation on the part of Hezbollah.
The United States conducted an airstrike on an IRGC weapons storage facility in eastern Syria in response to continued Iranian-sponsored attacks in Iraq and Syria, which injured three US servicemembers.
Does Iran not understand how expensive healthcare is in the United States? They gave three of our people tinnitus. No big deal, right? It’s just a small ringing in the ear. But do you know how much money that’s going to take to fix? The copay alone is going to eat those guys alive. I weep for their credit scores. Poor bastards.
Naturally we responded proportionally by blowing up an IRGC warehouse. Like, an actual IRGC asset in Syria, not some proxy-shell-company bullshit. While in Syria, the name on the lease says ‘Iran’, so this is technically a direct strike. It’s not the first, either, but it is the largest to date.
Thank you for enduring today's rant. The Chonhar Bridge Happy Fun Time Betting Pool remains ongoing.
Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova advertised several benefit schemes targeting children in occupied Ukraine as part of the "A Country for Children" strategic program.
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